lundi 12 décembre 2016

Presentation topics for week 12

FOR L2 STUDENTS

GROUP 2:

EXP 1: Amestoy Lisa / El Haddad Feriel: TEXT ? 

EXP 2: Leroux Mathilde / Lunzunza Grace-Divine

"Norman S. Fletcher served on the Supreme Court of Georgia for over 15 years and was its chief justice from 2001 to 2005" (The New York Times) ... to be confirmed

GROUP 3:

Aubergeon Léonie:

How the Electoral College Dump Donald Trump (The New York Times, Dec 2016)

GROUP 47:

EXP 1: Domingues Kelly / Salvan Gregoire: 

Donald Trump Picks John Kelly, Retired General, to Lead Homeland Security”. The New York Times


EXP 2: Saib Oriana 

From “reset” to “pause”: the real story behind Hillary Clinton’s feud with Vladimir Putin (The Washington Post)


GROUP 63:

EXP 1: Cordonnier Adèle / Degenne Zoé



EXP 2: Cogne Fanny / Buisson Elisabeth

Race and redistricting
The justices tackle racial gerrymandering
The Economist, Dec 6th 2016, 10:57 by S.M. | NEW YORK


GROUP 28:

Bou Chahine Tarek / Almouzni Paul


GROUP 29:

Felix Sixtine: text ?

GROUP 30: 

Hutin Audrey / Mesirdi Mehdi

Judges who are elected like politicians tend to act like them (Liptak, Dec 2016 The New York Times)




FOR L3 STUDENTS 

GROUP 16:

EXP 1: Regner Aude / Tolinchi Stanislas


Gun Control Advocates find a Deep-Pocketed Ally in Big law
(The New York Times, 7 Dec 2016)

EXP 2: Sefraoui Myriam / Ziessenis MArie-Ange: text?

GROUP 17:

EXP 1: Caquineau Marie / Jacob Léa

Supreme Court Allows Use of Execution Drug (2015, Adam Liptak, New York Times)

EXP 2: Meyer Arthur / Touvenin Chloé

The Supreme Court and a Life Barely Lived (Linda Greenhouse, Jan 2016, The New York Times)


GROUP 54:

EXP 1: Bionducci Lena / Haguet Quitterie

The Supreme Court is afraid of racial justice
The New York Times, June 2016
By OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/opinion/the-supreme-court-is-afraid-of-racial-justice.html?_r=1

EXP 2: Nilsen Luana / Moslonka Isaure: text ?

jeudi 24 novembre 2016

L3 Presentation Topic on the Sixth Amendment (Week 10)


Presentation topic for G 16, G 17, G 54

Justices Strengthen Right to Confront Witnesses
March 8, 2004 The New York Times
By DAVID STOUT

WASHINGTON, March 8 — The Supreme Court overturned an assault conviction from Washington State today as it broadened and sharpened a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.
In a case that has been closely watched by defense lawyers and prosecutors, the justices unanimously set aside the conviction of Michael D. Crawford of Olympia, who has been serving a 14-year sentence for stabbing a man who he apparently believed had tried to rape his wife.
The stabbing took place on Aug. 5, 1999, in the apartment of the victim, Kenneth Lee, in the presence of the defendant's wife, Sylvia. Mr. Crawford told the police that he had acted in self-defense. The case might have played out as a commonplace incident, ugly but routine, except that Mr. Crawford invoked the marital privilege under Washington State law to prevent his wife from testifying against him.

At trial, prosecutors introduced a tape recording of the statement that Mrs. Crawford had made under police questioning. They did so because there were discrepancies between the accounts of husband and wife, and prosecutors thought the wife's statement would undermine her husband's claim of self-defense.

In reversing the conviction today, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, cited the familiar phrase in the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall enjoy the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
"The right to confront one's accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times," Justice Scalia wrote.
That general principle of the Sixth Amendment has not been absolute in practice. A 1980 Supreme Court decision[1] spelled out certain instances in which the testimony of an unavailable witness may be allowed at trial, among them when the trial judge deems the witness particularly reliable for various reasons.
Today's ruling effectively erased the 1980 decision and severely curtailed, while not eliminating, prosecutors' ability to use the accounts of witnesses who cannot be cross-examined during trial. The American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers had filed briefs urging the conclusion that the court reached today.
In voiding the verdict and sending the case back to the lower courts, possibly for retrial, Justice Scalia held that the Sixth Amendment commands "not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."
Alluding to the 1980 decision, Justice Scalia wrote: "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."
The ramifications of today's ruling may not become clear immediately, but they could affect a number of previous convictions across the country. The testimony of a witness who cannot be cross-examined during trial may still be allowed, but only if the defense has had a chance to cross-examine him or her at an earlier stage in the case.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a separate opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in which he agreed that Mr. Crawford's conviction should be set aside. But the chief justice said Justice Scalia had swept aside the court's 1980 holding without sufficiently defining for "thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors" exactly what rules they can apply.

"They need them now, not months or years from now," the chief justice wrote.
Today's ruling in Crawford v. Washington, No. 02-9410, reversed a ruling by the Washington State Supreme Court. The state high court had reinstated the conviction after it had been set aside by a state appellate court.

L2: The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (John Ford, 1962)


L2 WEEK 10 PRESENTATION TOPIC (Article VI)

Presentation topic for Groups: 2, 63, 47, 28, 29, 30:
How law enforcement officers can kill someone and avoid prosecution

Present the main topic of the text. The article refers to many cases that illustrate the main argument. Focus on one or two of these cases and do a little research to give extra information.


Presentation topic for group 3: Marbury v. Madison

Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Just as George Washington helped shape the actual form that the executive branch would take, so the fourth chief justice, John Marshall, shaped the role that the courts would play.
Under the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, only members of the ruling Federalist Party were appointed to the bench, and under the terms of the Constitution, they held office for life during "good behavior." Thus, when the opposing Republicans won the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the judiciary. One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships. Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace.
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.
Marshall's decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de force. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted.
The critical importance of Marbury is the assumption of several powers by the Supreme Court. One was the authority to declare acts of Congress, and by implication acts of the president, unconstitutional if they exceeded the powers granted by the Constitution. But even more important, the Court became the arbiter of the Constitution, the final authority on what the document meant. As such, the Supreme Court became in fact as well as in theory an equal partner in government, and it has played that role ever since.
The Court would not declare another act of Congress unconstitutional until 1857, and it has used that power sparingly. But through its role as arbiter of the Constitution, it has, especially in the twentieth century, been the chief agency for the expansion of individual rights.

lundi 21 novembre 2016

L3 The Fifth Amendment (Double-jeopardy): Blueford v Arkansas (2012)

Blueford v. Arkansas (2012)
(See booklet, p. 68-69)

Summary:

Blueford, the defendant in this case, had been left in charge of his girlfriend’s one-year-old child. After a short while, the child had to be taken to hospital / Blueford’s friend, present at the scene, had to call emergency services to take the child to hospital because the latter was breathing with difficulty.
Having established that the death of child had been caused by close head injury, the police charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide.

Following protracted deliberation, the jury still deadlocked on some of the charges and proved unable either to find Blueford guilty of at least one the charges, or to acquit him of all charges. The judge therefore declared a mistrial.

(to deadlock on an issue / on some of the charges)

When the State of Arkansas re-indicted Blueford (prosecuted Blueford on all charges a second time), the latter moved to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder counts (the two most serious charges) arguing that such charges infringed on his Fifth Amendment protection against double-jeopardy.


(voc: a motion to dismiss)
 
In its majority opinion, however, the Supreme Court first contended that the jury had not formally acquitted the defendant so that his second trial did not violate Blueford’s constitutional rights.

(“Unlike cases where acquittal on lesser charges precluded retrial on greater charges, the jury’s decision here was not final”: The Court established a distinction between a report and a verdict).

Indeed, Justice Roberts further argued, Arkansas law requires either a conviction or a complete acquittal on all charges, which was not the case in Blueford’s trial.

Sotomayor’s vigorous dissent (/ The main argument of Sotomayor’s vigorous dissent) rests on a different interpretation of Arkansas law.

(voc: the opinion brought a sharp dissent from Justice Sotomayor)

Arkansas, she claims, is what is called an “acquittal-first jurisdiction” in which a jury may not consider a lesser-included offense unless and until it rejects a more serious offense.

Although Blueford had not formally been acquitted, the fact that the jury deadlocked when considering manslaughter proves / necessarily implies that they had implicitly rejected the counts of capital murder and first-degree murder. 



NB:
Close head injuries are a type of traumatic brain injury in which the skull and dura mater remain intact.

Arkansas is an "acquittal-first" jurisdiction, in which a jury may not consider a lesser-included offense unless and until it rejects a more serious offense. In other words, Blueford's jury could not consider the first-degree murder charge unless and until it rejected the capital murder charge, and it could not consider manslaughter unless and until it rejected first-degree murder. When Blueford's jury told the court it could not reach agreement, the forewoman told the judge that it was "unanimous against" capital and first-degree murder, but could not agree on manslaughter or negligent homicide. The judge sent the jury to deliberate further, refusing Blueford's request that the jury be allowed to enter a partial acquittal on the two charges.

dimanche 20 novembre 2016

L2 HOMEWORK for WEEK 9: ARTICLE 4

Study the introduction to the chapter p. 112-114 + Vocabulary p. 121.

Prepare exercises 1 and 2 (Comprehension on the facts) p. 114

Prepare the grammar exercise p. 120-121. (few, a few, little...)

Presentation topic: EXERCISE 2 p. 116-117.

All students should prepare the text and prepare a little summary in 5 or 6 sentences trying to use new vocabulary specific to the topic.