L2 HOMEWORK for week 10: Article VI

Homework for week 10: Article VI

Study all the vocabulary related to the chapters covered thus far (see the “what you need to know sections”. Prepare a ten-word quiz.

Study the introduction on Article 6. Prepare at least 5 questions on this introduction.

Exercise 2 Comprehension of the facts p. 113.

Grammar exercise If / tenses p. 123.

Study text p. 114

The presentation on week 10 will be on the text p. 114

L3 HOMEWORK / The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

Homework for week 10:

·      Study introduction to the Sixth Amendment p. 89-91.

·      Study glossary p. 95.

·      Exercise 1 and 2 p. 91

·      Grammar exercise on modal verbs: p. 94.

Group 51: One student will be asked to present (without notes!) a summary of the main protections offered by the Sixth Amendment before the rest of class.

Presentation for week 10: See Blog (L3 Homework)

For G 8, G 9, G 42, G 43, G 44, G 51

Justices Strengthen Right to Confront Witnesses

March 8, 2004 The New York Times

By DAVID STOUT

L3 Blueford v. Arkansas: Summary

Blueford v. Arkansas (2012)

(See booklet, p. 84-85)

Summary

Blueford, the defendant in this case, had been left in charge of his girlfriend’s one-year-old child. After a short while, the child had to be taken to hospital / Blueford’s friend, present at the scene, had to call emergency services to take the child to hospital because the latter was breathing with difficulty.

Having established that the death of child had been caused by close head injury, the police charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide.

Following protracted deliberation, the jury still deadlocked on some of the charges and proved unable either to find Blueford guilty of at least one the charges, or to acquit him of all charges. The judge therefore declared a mistrial.

When the State of Arkansas re-indicted Blueford (tried to retry Blueford on all charges), the latter moved to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder counts (the two most serious charges) arguing that such charges infringed on his Fifth Amendment protection against double-jeopardy.

In its majority opinion, however, the Supreme Court first contended that the jury had not formally acquitted the defendant so that his second trial did not violate Blueford’s constitutional rights. (“Unlike cases where acquittal on lesser charges precluded retrial on greater charges, the jury’s decision here was not final”: Distinction report / verdict). Indeed, Justice Roberts further argued, Arkansas law requires either a conviction or a complete acquittal on all charges, which was not the case in Blueford’s trial.

Sotomayor’s vigorous dissent (/ The main argument of Sotomayor’s vigorous dissent) rests on a different interpretation of Arkansas law. Arkansas, she claims, is what is called an “acquittal-first jurisdiction” in which a jury may not consider a lesser-included offense unless and until it rejects a more serious offense. Although Blueford had not formally been acquitted, the fact that the jury deadlocked when considering manslaughter proves / necessarily implies that they had implicitly rejected the counts of capital murder and first-degree murder. 

Closed-head injuries are a type of traumatic brain injury in which the skull and dura mater remain intact.

Arkansas is an "acquittal-first" jurisdiction, in which a jury may not consider a lesser-included offense unless and until it rejects a more serious offense. In other words, Blueford's jury could not consider the first-degree murder charge unless and until it rejected the capital murder charge, and it could not consider manslaughter unless and until it rejected first-degree murder. When Blueford's jury told the court it could not reach agreement, the forewoman told the judge that it was "unanimous against" capital and first-degree murder, but could not agree on manslaughter or negligent homicide. The judge sent the jury to deliberate further, refusing Blueford's request that the jury be allowed to enter a partial acquittal on the two charges.

Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008)

Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008)

Case summary

Facts of the case and trial proceedings:

In the case at hand, the petitioner, Kennedy, was accused of having raped his eight-year-old daughter.

or

In the case at hand, the petitioner, Kennedy, was charged with the rape of his eight-year-old daughter

or

Charged with the rape of his eight-year-old daughter, the petitioner, Kennedy, was convicted by the Louisiana trial court and sentenced to the death penalty, pursuant to a state statute / a state law allowing capital punishment for such an offence / for the rape of a child under 12 years of age.

Arguing that the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for an offence that did not involve the taking of another human life, Kennedy appealed the sentence.

Indeed, in Coker v. Georgia (1977), the USSC had ruled that the death penalty as a sentence for the rape of an adult woman was a “cruel and unusual punishment” that contravened / that went against the 8^th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

However, rejecting the appellant’s (i.e. Kennedy’s) reliance on Coker v. Georgia, on the basis that while Coker precludes / bars the use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman it does not specifically exclude capital punishment for other types of “nonhomicide” offences, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court’s sentence.

Why (and how) the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court:

Basing his claim on the potential violation of his constitutional right / Contending that the death penalty for a “nonhomicide” offence infringes the protection against cruel and unusual punishment provided by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. constitution, Kennedy filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the USSC.

(In your commentary, explain what a writ of certiorari is.)

In a 6-3 decision, the USSC reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

(At this stage, also explain: “reverse” and “remand”)

In its majority opinion, delivered by / penned by Justice Kennedy, the Court remarked upon / observed / emphasized / insisted on / underlined / stressed the general consensus stateside against the imposition of the death penalty for an offence other than murder / for a “nonhomicide” offense.

It further argued that general support for capital punishment for the rape of a child under 12 might offset / might outweigh the general consensus, but that no such support may be observed at present.

NB:

Note that there is no article before “support”

Contend (v.): argue

Proportionality: the punishment must be proportionate to the crime

Offence (UK Spelling) / Offense (US Spelling)

Defence (UK Spelling) / Defense (US Spelling)

Human (adj.) ≠ humane (adj.)

Tabulated report of the points and cases studied between week 1 and week 7

            

		Case study
Week 1	Federal and State judicial systems
Week 2	The U.S. Supreme Court power of Judicial Review Diagrams:  How Cases Reach the Supreme Court Reaching the Supreme Court:  - Writ of Appeal - Writ of Certiorari - Writ of Habeas Corpus	Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Week 3	Criminal Procedure The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) Incorporation of the Bill of Rights The due process clause Selective incorporation (Palko v. Connecticut (1937)) The Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule (The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine) and the exceptions to the exclusionary rule: Plain View / Search incident to a lawful arrest / Exigent Circumstances / Stop and Frisk Searches / Consent	Georgia v. Randolph (2006) (to be distinguished from U.S. v. Matlock (1974))
Week 4	Warrantless seizure of a passenger in a car The Fourth Amendment: Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures Definition of a “search” Probable cause / reasonable suspicion	Brendlin v. California (2007)
Week 5	The Miranda Rights ê Amendments 5 and 6 The Fifth Amendment: (Indictment by a grand jury in cases of ‘infamous crimes’) Protection against Double-Jeopardy Protection against Self-Incrimination (Right to due process of law) (The Just Compensation Clause) The Sixth Amendment: Right to a speedy and public trial Right to trial by an impartial jury Right to be informed of the nature of the charges The Confrontation clause: the right of the accused to cross-examine witnesses and to subpoena his / her own witnesses. Assistance of Counsel	Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)
Week 6	Pre-trial procedure: Distinction between misdemeanors and felonies Distinction between an indictment and an information The Role of the Prosecutor The Role of the Grand Jury The Initial Appearance (arraignment)   The Preliminary Hearing:    Probable Cause / The Rule of Evidence Plea Bargaining The Pre-trial motions: Motion to dismiss / Motion to suppress / Motion for discovery	Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982)
Week 7	Trial Stages: Reading of the Indictment / of the Information Opening Statements Witnesses for the Prosecution Motion for a judgment of acquittal Questioning of the Accused (and the Fifth Amendment) Witnesses for the Defence Rebuttal Motion for a redirect verdict Instructions Closing arguments of the parties Amendment 8: Focus on the “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” Clause.	Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008)
Week 8	In-Class Exam

L3 Homework for week 8 (Nov. 17th - Nov. 19th)

The 5^th Amendment

Homework for week 8:

·       Study the introduction to the Fifth Amendment: p. 78-82, focusing on:

-       Protection against double jeopardy

-       Protection against forced self-incrimination

A student chosen at random will have to summarize the introduction in front of the whole class...

·       Prepare exercise 1 (Comprehension) p. 82-83.

·       Learn by rote the glossary p. 88, as well as the lists of vocabulary related to Amendments 1, 2 and 4.

·       Prepare a quiz on all the vocabulary of the booklet covered so far. (See the “what you need to know” section at the end of each chapter. 

Presentation for week 8: 
G 42, 43, 44, 51: A Debate over delaying suspects' miranda rights (see blog)
G 8, 9: Blueford v. Arkansas (see booklet p. 84-85)

L2 Homework for Week 7: Nov. 17th, 2015.

Homework for week 7:

Study the introduction on “Article III: The Federal Judiciary”

Answer questions to exercises 1 and 2, p. 90-91, as well as to exercise 2 p. 95 (Verb Tenses)

Presentation for week 7: Marbury v Madison (that has been posted on the blog)

We will start the class by correcting the exercises on the Electoral System that we did not correct last week:

Grammar exercise 2 p. 79.

Grammar exercise p. 86. 

The in-class text will take place on Tuesday Nov. 18^th, as initially scheduled. 

L2 The U.S. Judiciary: Presentation topic

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Just as George Washington helped shape the actual form that the executive branch would take, so the fourth chief justice, John Marshall, shaped the role that the courts would play.

Under the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, only members of the ruling Federalist Party were appointed to the bench, and under the terms of the Constitution, they held office for life during "good behavior." Thus, when the opposing Republicans won the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the judiciary. One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships. Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace.

The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.

Marshall's decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de force. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted.

The critical importance of Marbury is the assumption of several powers by the Supreme Court. One was the authority to declare acts of Congress, and by implication acts of the president, unconstitutional if they exceeded the powers granted by the Constitution. But even more important, the Court became the arbiter of the Constitution, the final authority on what the document meant. As such, the Supreme Court became in fact as well as in theory an equal partner in government, and it has played that role ever since.

The Court would not declare another act of Congress unconstitutional until 1857, and it has used that power sparingly. But through its role as arbiter of the Constitution, it has, especially in the twentieth century, been the chief agency for the expansion of individual rights.

L3 WEEK 10, The Sixth Amendment: Presentation Topic

Presentation topic for G 8, G 9, G 42, G 43, G 44 & G 51:

Justices Strengthen Right to Confront Witnesses

March 8, 2004 The New York Times

By DAVID STOUT

WASHINGTON, March 8 — The Supreme Court overturned an assault conviction from Washington State today as it broadened and sharpened a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.

In a case that has been closely watched by defense lawyers and prosecutors, the justices unanimously set aside the conviction of Michael D. Crawford of Olympia, who has been serving a 14-year sentence for stabbing a man who he apparently believed had tried to rape his wife.

The stabbing took place on Aug. 5, 1999, in the apartment of the victim, Kenneth Lee, in the presence of the defendant's wife, Sylvia. Mr. Crawford told the police that he had acted in self-defense. The case might have played out as a commonplace incident, ugly but routine, except that Mr. Crawford invoked the marital privilege under Washington State law to prevent his wife from testifying against him.

At trial, prosecutors introduced a tape recording of the statement that Mrs. Crawford had made under police questioning. They did so because there were discrepancies between the accounts of husband and wife, and prosecutors thought the wife's statement would undermine her husband's claim of self-defense.

In reversing the conviction today, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, cited the familiar phrase in the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall enjoy the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

"The right to confront one's accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times," Justice Scalia wrote.

That general principle of the Sixth Amendment has not been absolute in practice. A 1980 Supreme Court decision spelled out certain instances in which the testimony of an unavailable witness may be allowed at trial, among them when the trial judge deems the witness particularly reliable for various reasons.

Today's ruling effectively erased the 1980 decision and severely curtailed, while not eliminating, prosecutors' ability to use the accounts of witnesses who cannot be cross-examined during trial. The American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers had filed briefs urging the conclusion that the court reached today.

In voiding the verdict and sending the case back to the lower courts, possibly for retrial, Justice Scalia held that the Sixth Amendment commands "not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."

Alluding to the 1980 decision, Justice Scalia wrote: "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."

The ramifications of today's ruling may not become clear immediately, but they could affect a number of previous convictions across the country. The testimony of a witness who cannot be cross-examined during trial may still be allowed, but only if the defense has had a chance to cross-examine him or her at an earlier stage in the case.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a separate opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in which he agreed that Mr. Crawford's conviction should be set aside. But the chief justice said Justice Scalia had swept aside the court's 1980 holding without sufficiently defining for "thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors" exactly what rules they can apply.

"They need them now, not months or years from now," the chief justice wrote.

Today's ruling in Crawford v. Washington, No. 02-9410, reversed a ruling by the Washington State Supreme Court. The state high court had reinstated the conviction after it had been set aside by a state appellate court.