L2 Videos related to Text 2 p. 116 (Discussed in class): VL v. EL

L3 Presentation Topic on the Sixth Amendment (Week 10)

Presentation topic for G 16, G 17, G 54

Justices Strengthen Right to Confront Witnesses

March 8, 2004 The New York Times

By DAVID STOUT

WASHINGTON, March 8 — The Supreme Court overturned an assault conviction from Washington State today as it broadened and sharpened a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.

In a case that has been closely watched by defense lawyers and prosecutors, the justices unanimously set aside the conviction of Michael D. Crawford of Olympia, who has been serving a 14-year sentence for stabbing a man who he apparently believed had tried to rape his wife.

The stabbing took place on Aug. 5, 1999, in the apartment of the victim, Kenneth Lee, in the presence of the defendant's wife, Sylvia. Mr. Crawford told the police that he had acted in self-defense. The case might have played out as a commonplace incident, ugly but routine, except that Mr. Crawford invoked the marital privilege under Washington State law to prevent his wife from testifying against him.

At trial, prosecutors introduced a tape recording of the statement that Mrs. Crawford had made under police questioning. They did so because there were discrepancies between the accounts of husband and wife, and prosecutors thought the wife's statement would undermine her husband's claim of self-defense.

In reversing the conviction today, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, cited the familiar phrase in the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall enjoy the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

"The right to confront one's accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times," Justice Scalia wrote.

That general principle of the Sixth Amendment has not been absolute in practice. A 1980 Supreme Court decision[1] spelled out certain instances in which the testimony of an unavailable witness may be allowed at trial, among them when the trial judge deems the witness particularly reliable for various reasons.

Today's ruling effectively erased the 1980 decision and severely curtailed, while not eliminating, prosecutors' ability to use the accounts of witnesses who cannot be cross-examined during trial. The American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers had filed briefs urging the conclusion that the court reached today.

In voiding the verdict and sending the case back to the lower courts, possibly for retrial, Justice Scalia held that the Sixth Amendment commands "not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."

Alluding to the 1980 decision, Justice Scalia wrote: "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."

The ramifications of today's ruling may not become clear immediately, but they could affect a number of previous convictions across the country. The testimony of a witness who cannot be cross-examined during trial may still be allowed, but only if the defense has had a chance to cross-examine him or her at an earlier stage in the case.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a separate opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in which he agreed that Mr. Crawford's conviction should be set aside. But the chief justice said Justice Scalia had swept aside the court's 1980 holding without sufficiently defining for "thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors" exactly what rules they can apply.

"They need them now, not months or years from now," the chief justice wrote.

Today's ruling in Crawford v. Washington, No. 02-9410, reversed a ruling by the Washington State Supreme Court. The state high court had reinstated the conviction after it had been set aside by a state appellate court.

L2: The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (John Ford, 1962)

L2 WEEK 10 PRESENTATION TOPIC (Article VI)

Presentation topic for Groups: 2, 63, 47, 28, 29, 30:
How law enforcement officers can kill someone and avoid prosecution

Present the main topic of the text. The article refers to many cases that illustrate the main argument. Focus on one or two of these cases and do a little research to give extra information.


Presentation topic for group 3: Marbury v. Madison

Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Just as George Washington helped shape the actual form that the executive branch would take, so the fourth chief justice, John Marshall, shaped the role that the courts would play.
Under the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, only members of the ruling Federalist Party were appointed to the bench, and under the terms of the Constitution, they held office for life during "good behavior." Thus, when the opposing Republicans won the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the judiciary. One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships. Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace.
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.
Marshall's decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de force. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted.
The critical importance of Marbury is the assumption of several powers by the Supreme Court. One was the authority to declare acts of Congress, and by implication acts of the president, unconstitutional if they exceeded the powers granted by the Constitution. But even more important, the Court became the arbiter of the Constitution, the final authority on what the document meant. As such, the Supreme Court became in fact as well as in theory an equal partner in government, and it has played that role ever since.
The Court would not declare another act of Congress unconstitutional until 1857, and it has used that power sparingly. But through its role as arbiter of the Constitution, it has, especially in the twentieth century, been the chief agency for the expansion of individual rights.

L3 The Fifth Amendment (Double-jeopardy): Blueford v Arkansas (2012)

Blueford v. Arkansas (2012)
(See booklet, p. 68-69)

Summary:

Blueford, the defendant in this case, had been left in charge of his girlfriend’s one-year-old child. After a short while, the child had to be taken to hospital / Blueford’s friend, present at the scene, had to call emergency services to take the child to hospital because the latter was breathing with difficulty.
Having established that the death of child had been caused by close head injury, the police charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide.

Following protracted deliberation, the jury still deadlocked on some of the charges and proved unable either to find Blueford guilty of at least one the charges, or to acquit him of all charges. The judge therefore declared a mistrial.

(to deadlock on an issue / on some of the charges)

When the State of Arkansas re-indicted Blueford (prosecuted Blueford on all charges a second time), the latter moved to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder counts (the two most serious charges) arguing that such charges infringed on his Fifth Amendment protection against double-jeopardy.


(voc: a motion to dismiss)
 
In its majority opinion, however, the Supreme Court first contended that the jury had not formally acquitted the defendant so that his second trial did not violate Blueford’s constitutional rights.

(“Unlike cases where acquittal on lesser charges precluded retrial on greater charges, the jury’s decision here was not final”: The Court established a distinction between a report and a verdict).

Indeed, Justice Roberts further argued, Arkansas law requires either a conviction or a complete acquittal on all charges, which was not the case in Blueford’s trial.

Sotomayor’s vigorous dissent (/ The main argument of Sotomayor’s vigorous dissent) rests on a different interpretation of Arkansas law.

(voc: the opinion brought a sharp dissent from Justice Sotomayor)

Arkansas, she claims, is what is called an “acquittal-first jurisdiction” in which a jury may not consider a lesser-included offense unless and until it rejects a more serious offense.

Although Blueford had not formally been acquitted, the fact that the jury deadlocked when considering manslaughter proves / necessarily implies that they had implicitly rejected the counts of capital murder and first-degree murder. 



NB:
Close head injuries are a type of traumatic brain injury in which the skull and dura mater remain intact.

Arkansas is an "acquittal-first" jurisdiction, in which a jury may not consider a lesser-included offense unless and until it rejects a more serious offense. In other words, Blueford's jury could not consider the first-degree murder charge unless and until it rejected the capital murder charge, and it could not consider manslaughter unless and until it rejected first-degree murder. When Blueford's jury told the court it could not reach agreement, the forewoman told the judge that it was "unanimous against" capital and first-degree murder, but could not agree on manslaughter or negligent homicide. The judge sent the jury to deliberate further, refusing Blueford's request that the jury be allowed to enter a partial acquittal on the two charges.

L2 HOMEWORK for WEEK 9: ARTICLE 4

Study the introduction to the chapter p. 112-114 + Vocabulary p. 121.

Prepare exercises 1 and 2 (Comprehension on the facts) p. 114

Prepare the grammar exercise p. 120-121. (few, a few, little...)

Presentation topic: EXERCISE 2 p. 116-117.

All students should prepare the text and prepare a little summary in 5 or 6 sentences trying to use new vocabulary specific to the topic.

L2 PRESENTATION TOPIC for WEEK 9 ( 22-24 Nov. 2016): ARTICLE IV

The presentation will be based on the following document:

"SCOTUS Ruling Affirms LGBT Parental Rights: VL v. EL Creates Important Protections for Families" , text 2 p. 116-117 of the booklet. 

L3 S1 (2016) Summaries and Vocabulary

Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005)

The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Ginsburg.

Section 3 of ‘The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA)’ provides that no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution unless the burden furthers a compelling government interest and does so by the least restrictive means.

The plaintiffs (below) and petitioners (here) in this case, a group former and current of prisoners / inmates held in Ohio prisons, argue that in violation of RLUIPA, Ohio Prison officials have failed to accommodate their exercise of non-mainstream religions in a variety of ways.
Indeed, RLUIPA prohibit government « from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest. » (see oyez.org)

Ohio prison officials, on the other hand, challenge the constitutionality of RLUIPA on the grounds that it advances religions (and therefore clashes / runs afoul of / contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). By virtue of the First Amendment, they argue, government may not make laws respecting an establishment of religion.

The District Court found for the inmates
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

SCOTUS reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals’s ruling and found for the inmates.

It held that there was space for legislative action, neither compelled by the Free Exercise clause nor prohibited by the Establishment clause and therefore that « RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment ». « The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. »

(The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.)


Employment Division v. Smith 1990
-First Amendment, Religion Clauses-
Under the Free Exercise clause, the government may not prohibit religious activities by laws that are primarily based on religious grounds. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional for a State to prohibit the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship purposes”.

However, the respondents argue that the clause also protects religious activities from the effects of laws which do not have the aim of prohibiting religious activity, but which do affect religion incidentally. 

The overall aim of the law in question is to prohibit the abuse of a wide variety of drugs, and only has the incidental effect of criminalizing a religious practice.
(The respondents Nonetheless believe that they should be exempt from it. (See l. 28-30 and also l. 79-81))

The argument of the Court is that if the law may not interfere with religious beliefs, it may however interfere with religious practices.

If religious beliefs exempted someone from abiding by the law, this would mean that religious beliefs supersede / prevail over the law of the land. This is not the case.

Consequently, a law of general applicability (i.e. not drafted with the aim of prohibiting religious activity), must be respected by individuals, whatever their religious beliefs may be, and so even if the law incidentally interferes with their religious practices.

(See l. 40-42): “ The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.”
The first two cases, Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), are hybrid cases.
The Court allowed exemption from a neutral, generally applicable law because both the right to free exercise and another constitutional protection, had been infringed:
In Cantwell v Connecticut (1940) the freedom of speech was abridged. In Wisconsin v Yoder (1972) the freedom of parents to direct the education of their children was infringed.

These two cases differ from Sherbert v.Verner (1963), as Sherbert’s refusal to work on a Saturday was not prohibited by law.


Vocabulary selected by students from G 54
– to reverse (a decision) : To overthrow, invalidate, repeal, or revoke.
For example, an appeals court reverses the judgment, decree, or sentence of a lower court either by substituting its own decision or by returning the case to the lower court with instructions for a new trial.
– unemployment benefits : a financial help granted by the government to someone who has lost his job, as a
compensation
–  a claim for relief : statement of the plaintiff explaining the legal motivation for his request / The section of a modern complaint that states the redress sought from a court by a person who initiates a lawsuit.
–  a critical distinction : a crucial, essential distinction
–  an individual’s willingness : the readiness of a person
–  to forgo : to abstain (from + verb)
–  to be reinforced : to be strengthened
- to profess a religious doctrine : to demonstrate your religious belief towards others
- to compel affirmation : to force to confess to something
- abstention of a physical act : the fact of deliberately not doing something
- to ban : to prohibit
- respondent in a case : the person being sued, or (on appeal) the person that did not bring the appeal, as opposed to the appellant or the petitioner
- to seek to something : to aim at doing something/ to try to do something
- to contend/ to assert : to claim
- to require : to demand
- compliance of a law : obedience of a law
- in the course of : throughout
- subsequent decisions : following decisions
- notwithstanding : regardless of
- constitutional infirmity : violation of the constitution
- to sustain : to pronounce in favor of
- to conscript : to force somebody to sign up for the military
– to bar application : to forbid application
– to petition the government for the redress of grievances : to ask a governmental body to solve a problem/a 
complaint
– to envision : to contemplate, to consider
– likewise : 1. in the same way / 2. in addition / 3. used in informal speech to say that you share the feelings that someone else has just expressed
– to acknowledge (a right): to recognize, to admit (that someone has that right) – a license plate : the plate on a motorized vehicle with numbers and letters
– a contention : 1. something (such as a belief, opinion, or idea) that is argued or stated/ 2. anger and disagreement / 3. a situation in which you have a chance to win something that you are trying to win
– a stance : 1. a publicly stated opinion / 2. a way of standing
– to relieve : to exempt (from + verb) (in the text) 



“Town of Greece v. Galloway”
-First Amendment, Religion Clauses-



The issue at stake in this case is whether the fact that Town Board sessions in Greece (N.Y.) start with sectarian prayers violates citizens’ First Amendment Freedom of Religion.

The petitioners in the case argue that these very often Christian prayers ‘run afoul of’ the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion.


In a split 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court that the prayers’s main purpose was to stress (to emphasize) the solemnity of the ceremony as well as values part of the ‘nation’s heritage’.

The court ruled that sectarians prayers read at the opening of Town Board Meetings did not infringe the establishment clause of the First Amendment.

To have been unconstitutional, the prayers would have had to ‘denigrate, prozelytise or betray an impermissible government purpose’, which is not the case.

Justice Kennedy underlined that the fact that the petitioners felt disrespected was irrelevant.

This case builds on another case, Marsh v. Chambers (1983) that discussed the constitutionality of prayers to open legislative sessions.  “Town of Greece v. Galloway”, however differs from the previous case in that citizens are free to attend Town Board Meetings.

Note that Justice Kagan, however, dissented.


Vocabulary selected by students from G 17.

Town boards, (n.): A city council, town council, town board, or board of aldermen is the legislative body that governs a city, town, municipality or local government area.
Sectarian prayers, (n.): A spiritual communion with God or an object of worship, as in supplication, thanksgiving, adoration, or confession, of a specific religion.
Chaplain, (n.): An ecclesiastic attached to the chapel of a royal court, college, etc., or to a military unit; as well as a person who says the prayer, invocation, etc., for an organization or at an assembly.
To lend gravity, (v.): Give solemnity.
Dissent: To differ in sentiment or opinion, especially from the majority. « To write a dissenting opinion »
Irrespective of, (adj + prep): Regardless of
Afoul, (adj./adv.): In conflict with / to run afoul of
Impermissible, (adj.): That cannot be allowed
Coercion, (n.): Forcing by intimidation
Merely, (adv.): Simply
Constituent, (n.): Voter
Framer, (n.): Writer
Withstand something, (v.):  Resist
Assertion, (n.): Statement
Prominent, (adj.): Noticeable
Denigrate somebody, (v.): Disparage, put down
Solely, (adv.): Completely


Walker v Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, (2014)
-First Amendment-
(Listening Comprehension)

The question before the Court is whether a state can veto a message that uses  a design that is offensive to some people in this case the Confederate flag.

The Sons of Confederate Veterans requested the DMV, a government agency, to issue specialty licence plates featuring the Confederate flag. The DMV (the Department of Motor Vehicles), whose approval is required before licence plates are issued, disagreed / The DMV rejected the proposed plate on the grounds that a majority of the population associate the confederate flag with associations that demean or express hatred for minorities

This generated considerable controversy.

Indeed, some claim such a plate would be a reminder of a dark period of American history and of a legalised system of involuntary servitude, rape, mass murder.

The Sons of Confederate veterans, however, argue that the Confederate flag is a federally approved logo.

The Sons of Confederate Veterans sued, contending that the State violated their First Amendment Free Speech Right.

A federal District court found for the Sons of Confederate Veterans. A Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and the State of Texas then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The argument of Texas is that an organisation cannot « commandeer » the machinery of government to convey a message that the government does not want to associate with.

The Former Solicitor General (speaking on behalf of Texas) argues that individuals are free to « festoon » their cars with « bumper stickers » representing the Confederate Flag if they want to, but that they cannot compel the State of Texas to issue official license plates featuring this flag.

The Association, on the other hand, claims that Texas has an official policy of honouring their forebears, thanks to monuments, statues, memorabilia, the reenactment of battles on Capitol Grounds and a state holiday honouring Confederate Veterans and that the DMV does not have the power to second-guess the legislature on whether or not to honour Confederate veterans. On top of this the Constitution does not give the power to ban certain categories of speech simply because they are offensive.

The former Texas Solicitor General rejects that proposition when the speaker is the State.

Nearly 40 years ago, (Wooley v. Maynard, 1977) the Supreme Court ruled that the government may not require drivers to put license plates on their cars that carry an ideological message they disagree with. That case concerned Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing to have licence plates featuring the New Hampshire State motto « Live Free of Die ».

In the present case, the question is reversed, questioning whether the State may reject some messages for specialty licence plates.

Vocabulary:

A proposition (n.): 1. something (such as a plan or offer) that is presented to a person or group of people to consider / 2. (in the document) a statement to be proved, explained, or discussed / 3. something that someone intends to do or deal with

To second-guess (someone) (v.): 1. to criticise or question the actions or decisions of someone / 2. to try to guess or predict what (someone or something) will do

The Court’s decision (from oyez.com):

Question

1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality?

2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination?
Conclusion

Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority.

The court ruled that, yes, « Specialty license plates qualify as government speech, thus states can refuse proposed designs. »

As for / With regard to question 2, « the Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas’s specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval ».





Elonis v. US (2015)

Schooling the Supreme Court on Rap Music

-First Amendment, True Threats and the intent of the Speaker-

This question in this case is whether « true threats » should be determined by the listener’s perception of the message or by the speaker’s intention. 
The court decision will serve two purposes:
It will establish a test to be applied to determine whether threats are protected by the First Amendment or not.
It will examine whether Rap lyrics are an Art form.
The reason why the case reached the Supreme Court is that at Elonis’s trial, the Jury had been instructed that the legal standard for finding true threat was whether an objective person would perceive the posts as threatening.
Elonis’s argument is that the test should focus on whether he intended the Facebook posts he sent to his ex-wife to be perceived as true threats. Elonis wants the Court to focus on the « mens rea » of the defendant.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied an objective test and ruled that to determine whether a message fitted in the category of true threat one should question whether a reasonable person would perceive the message as such.
On the other hand, in a case involving a white supremacist in Utah, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the intention of the speaker (thereby conducting an inquiry into the mind of the accused).
(From oyez.org)
PETITIONER: Anthony Elonis
RESPONDENT: United States
DECIDED BY: Roberts Court (2010-2016)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Facts of the case
Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the "true threat" exception was created to prevent.
Question
Does a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. §875(c) require proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten?
Conclusion: 8–1 DECISION FOR ANTHONY ELONIS
MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR.
The law requires proof of the defendant's intent to threaten, not negligence or a reasonable listener test.
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten . An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed that the prosecution only needed to prove negligence, but he argued that the majority opinion should have addressed what the proper instruction should be. By leaving out what the prosecution did need to show, attorneys and judges are left to guess whether knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate standard. Justice Alito also argued that recklessness should be the standard because a higher standard would effectively change the law rather than clarify it.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals had already addressed this issue and resolved it with a general intent standard. The majority opinion not only overturns their rulings but also leaves the courts uncertain as to whether an intent to threaten is required or whether recklessness will suffice. Justice Thomas also argued that knowledge of posting the relevant threats is enough to establish the intent element because knowledge of those facts is required to make the actions illegal; ignorance of those actions being illegal should not provide shelter from the law.
Vocabulary selected by students in L3 G 54
Fighting words  Words intentionally directed toward another person which are so offensive as to cause the hearer to suffer emotional distress or incite him/her to immediately retaliate physically.
Hate speech  Speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, to distinguish with a speech of hatred against another person, for reasons others than discrimination.
Incorporated  a right protected by the Bill of Rights is incorporated when the US Supreme Court rules that it is so fundamental to the conception of due process of law that it must apply to the states through the 14th Amendment.
To sue  to initiate a legal action.
True threat  statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to an individual.
To distinguish with Offensive speech  words that can hurt the sensibility of the individual to whom it is addressed to, but that cannot be pursued, as it is protected by the First Amendment.
First Amendment (Freedom of Speech)  added to the US Constitution in 1791, contained in the Bill of Rights. In its dispositions relative to the freedom of speech, fundamental constitutional right, it is said that States cannot make any law that can abridge the freedom of speech.
Freedom of Speech  defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as the right for an individual to make know to anybody the result of his intellectual activity. It is now known as a fundamental individual right.
Reasonable person/Objective standard  legal standard sometimes used in court, that asks the question “how would a reasonable person interpret it ?”
Subjective standard  another legal standard that places the cursor on the person directly concerned, for instance to know if the person concerned felt himself threatened.






Shelby Co. v. Holder (14th Amendment)


Vocabulary selected by students in L3 G 54
An « amici curiae » brief : brief sent to the Supreme Court from someone who's not a party to the case, but has interests in the matter and who gives the court his opinion, tries to influence the court's decision.// Educates the Court on point of law that are in doubt, gathers or organizes information, or raises awareness about some aspect of the case that the court might otherwise miss.
To uphold: to maintain / affirm (esp. in legal English, to affirm a judicial decision, a ruling)
enforcement clause : a clause to make sure that the provision is enacted
To enforce (v.)
To enact legislation: to promulgate
(Note that « legislation » is uncountable / To enact legislation, to enact a piece of legislation)
Prophylactic (adj.): acting to defend/protect against
deference (Uncountable): to show respect
A bulwark : 1. (In the text) something serving as a safeguard / 2. a wall that is built for protection / 3. a wall that is part of a ship's sides and that is above the ship's upper deck
Preclearance: Advance approval by a federal court or the Department of Justice for changes to voting regulations in certain states under the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
CAC: Constitutional Accountability Center

Untruths about ‘anchor babies’ (14th Amendment)


Vocabulary selected by students in L3 G 2
A fine (n.) =  a :  a sum imposed as punishment for an offense / b : a forfeiture or penalty paid to an injured party in a civil action / in the text: to be understood in the sense of ‘paying the price for being undocumented’, as the situation was particularly difficult for Pedro’s parents.
Sidelines (n.) =   a line at right angles to a goal line or end line and marking a side of a court or field of play for athletic games / in the text: to stand on the sidelines = to watch something as a spectator, without taking part in the event.
Bias (n.): a tendency to believe that some people, ideas, etc., are better than others that usually results in treating some people unfairly / a strong interest in something or ability to do something
To be unbiased (adj.) = to be impartial (Antonym: to be biased)
To avoid (v.) = keep away from something/someone / Structure: to avoid doing something
avoid + v-ing
To wade across (v.) = to walk across something covered by water
Fanciful (adj.) = imaginary
Wholeness (n.) = 1. The state of forming a complete and harmonious whole; unity / 2. The state of being unbroken or undamaged / 3. Good physical or mental health. / entirety / integrity
To swaddle (v.) = to wrap (someone, especially a baby) tightly with a blanket, pieces of cloth, etc.
To open the floodgates (v.) = to remove something serving to restrain an outburst.
Ex: ‘Many people fear that the court's latest ruling will open the floodgates for/to a host of new lawsuits.’
Turgid (adj.) =  very complicated and difficult to understand / swollen 
To whine (v.) =  to complain in an annoying way / to make a high crying sound / to make a high and unpleasant sound that continues for a long time.

L3 Homework for Week 7: The Fourth Amendment

Groups 16 and 17: 

Study the introduction to the Fourth Amendment p. 51-52 as well as the vocabulary p. 62.

Prepare exercises 1 and 2 p. 53.

Read text 2 p. 55-56 and prepare a quick summary in five sentences. 

(Presentation topic: text 1)

Group 54:

Study the introduction to the Fourth Amendment p. 51-52 as well as the vocabulary p. 62.

Prepare exercise 1 p. 53.

Read text 1 p. 54 and prepare a quick summary in five sentences.

(Presentation topic: text 2)

L2 HOMEWORK + Presentation topic for WEEK 7 (The Judiciary)

Homework (for groups 2, 3, 63, 47, 28, 29, 30):

Study the introduction to the unit on "The Federal Judiciary" p. 95-97 (+ p. 100)

Prepare exercise 1 and 2 p. 98 and 99.

Read text n° 3 p. 104 and prepare a summary in five sentences. Prepare exercise 1 p. 105.
(Information for G 2, G 3 and G 47: the questions (ex 2 p. 105) will help you identify the main point of the text and prepare your summary.)

Do not forget to study the vocabulary of the what you need to know section of each chapter as well as the vocabulary covered in class so far that is available on the blog (Libellé: L2 Vocabulary and Summaries)

Presentation topic for Week 7: text 3 p. 104.

L2 Students Correction of ex. 2 p. 26 (The First Amendment, the Religion Clauses)

Part Two: The religion clauses
Exercise 2:
At a basic level, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause have been interpreted to protect (1) religious liberty in different but complementary ways. The establishment clause prevents the government from establishing (2) a state religion or using the powers of the government to support a particular religion, and the free exercise clause prohibits the government from (3) intruding on individual religious choices. By (4) forbidding state support of religion, the establishment clause gives greater latitude to an individual’s exercise of religious choice, and by committing religious belief and practice to the (5) realm of individual choice, the free exercise clause reduces the possibility that religion will become an area of state power.
Freedom of religion is so fundamental (6) to our understanding of the American way of life that it may be surprising that the Supreme Court dealt with few religion cases (7) until the middle of the twentieth century. By then, of course, the role of government had vastly expanded; states as well as the federal government (8) regulated, intervened in, and financially supported a (9) host of activities that previously had been wholly committed to the private sector. In doing so, the potential (10) conflict between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause became apparent. If a stare provides special education services to students in a religious school, isn’t it supporting an establishment of religion? But if it does not, is it (11) abridging the free exercise of religion by parents whose beliefs compel them to send their children to religious school?
Extract from Law 101, by Jay M. Feinman (2010)