L3 S1 (2016) Summaries and Vocabulary

Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005)

The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Ginsburg.

Section 3 of ‘The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA)’ provides that no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution unless the burden furthers a compelling government interest and does so by the least restrictive means.

The plaintiffs (below) and petitioners (here) in this case, a group former and current of prisoners / inmates held in Ohio prisons, argue that in violation of RLUIPA, Ohio Prison officials have failed to accommodate their exercise of non-mainstream religions in a variety of ways.
Indeed, RLUIPA prohibit government « from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest. » (see oyez.org)

Ohio prison officials, on the other hand, challenge the constitutionality of RLUIPA on the grounds that it advances religions (and therefore clashes / runs afoul of / contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). By virtue of the First Amendment, they argue, government may not make laws respecting an establishment of religion.

The District Court found for the inmates
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

SCOTUS reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals’s ruling and found for the inmates.

It held that there was space for legislative action, neither compelled by the Free Exercise clause nor prohibited by the Establishment clause and therefore that « RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment ». « The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. »

(The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.)


Employment Division v. Smith 1990
-First Amendment, Religion Clauses-
Under the Free Exercise clause, the government may not prohibit religious activities by laws that are primarily based on religious grounds. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional for a State to prohibit the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship purposes”.

However, the respondents argue that the clause also protects religious activities from the effects of laws which do not have the aim of prohibiting religious activity, but which do affect religion incidentally. 

The overall aim of the law in question is to prohibit the abuse of a wide variety of drugs, and only has the incidental effect of criminalizing a religious practice.
(The respondents Nonetheless believe that they should be exempt from it. (See l. 28-30 and also l. 79-81))

The argument of the Court is that if the law may not interfere with religious beliefs, it may however interfere with religious practices.

If religious beliefs exempted someone from abiding by the law, this would mean that religious beliefs supersede / prevail over the law of the land. This is not the case.

Consequently, a law of general applicability (i.e. not drafted with the aim of prohibiting religious activity), must be respected by individuals, whatever their religious beliefs may be, and so even if the law incidentally interferes with their religious practices.

(See l. 40-42): “ The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.”
The first two cases, Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), are hybrid cases.
The Court allowed exemption from a neutral, generally applicable law because both the right to free exercise and another constitutional protection, had been infringed:
In Cantwell v Connecticut (1940) the freedom of speech was abridged. In Wisconsin v Yoder (1972) the freedom of parents to direct the education of their children was infringed.

These two cases differ from Sherbert v.Verner (1963), as Sherbert’s refusal to work on a Saturday was not prohibited by law.


Vocabulary selected by students from G 54
– to reverse (a decision) : To overthrow, invalidate, repeal, or revoke.
For example, an appeals court reverses the judgment, decree, or sentence of a lower court either by substituting its own decision or by returning the case to the lower court with instructions for a new trial.
– unemployment benefits : a financial help granted by the government to someone who has lost his job, as a
compensation
–  a claim for relief : statement of the plaintiff explaining the legal motivation for his request / The section of a modern complaint that states the redress sought from a court by a person who initiates a lawsuit.
–  a critical distinction : a crucial, essential distinction
–  an individual’s willingness : the readiness of a person
–  to forgo : to abstain (from + verb)
–  to be reinforced : to be strengthened
- to profess a religious doctrine : to demonstrate your religious belief towards others
- to compel affirmation : to force to confess to something
- abstention of a physical act : the fact of deliberately not doing something
- to ban : to prohibit
- respondent in a case : the person being sued, or (on appeal) the person that did not bring the appeal, as opposed to the appellant or the petitioner
- to seek to something : to aim at doing something/ to try to do something
- to contend/ to assert : to claim
- to require : to demand
- compliance of a law : obedience of a law
- in the course of : throughout
- subsequent decisions : following decisions
- notwithstanding : regardless of
- constitutional infirmity : violation of the constitution
- to sustain : to pronounce in favor of
- to conscript : to force somebody to sign up for the military
– to bar application : to forbid application
– to petition the government for the redress of grievances : to ask a governmental body to solve a problem/a 
complaint
– to envision : to contemplate, to consider
– likewise : 1. in the same way / 2. in addition / 3. used in informal speech to say that you share the feelings that someone else has just expressed
– to acknowledge (a right): to recognize, to admit (that someone has that right) – a license plate : the plate on a motorized vehicle with numbers and letters
– a contention : 1. something (such as a belief, opinion, or idea) that is argued or stated/ 2. anger and disagreement / 3. a situation in which you have a chance to win something that you are trying to win
– a stance : 1. a publicly stated opinion / 2. a way of standing
– to relieve : to exempt (from + verb) (in the text) 



“Town of Greece v. Galloway”
-First Amendment, Religion Clauses-



The issue at stake in this case is whether the fact that Town Board sessions in Greece (N.Y.) start with sectarian prayers violates citizens’ First Amendment Freedom of Religion.

The petitioners in the case argue that these very often Christian prayers ‘run afoul of’ the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion.


In a split 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court that the prayers’s main purpose was to stress (to emphasize) the solemnity of the ceremony as well as values part of the ‘nation’s heritage’.

The court ruled that sectarians prayers read at the opening of Town Board Meetings did not infringe the establishment clause of the First Amendment.

To have been unconstitutional, the prayers would have had to ‘denigrate, prozelytise or betray an impermissible government purpose’, which is not the case.

Justice Kennedy underlined that the fact that the petitioners felt disrespected was irrelevant.

This case builds on another case, Marsh v. Chambers (1983) that discussed the constitutionality of prayers to open legislative sessions.  “Town of Greece v. Galloway”, however differs from the previous case in that citizens are free to attend Town Board Meetings.

Note that Justice Kagan, however, dissented.


Vocabulary selected by students from G 17.

Town boards, (n.): A city council, town council, town board, or board of aldermen is the legislative body that governs a city, town, municipality or local government area.
Sectarian prayers, (n.): A spiritual communion with God or an object of worship, as in supplication, thanksgiving, adoration, or confession, of a specific religion.
Chaplain, (n.): An ecclesiastic attached to the chapel of a royal court, college, etc., or to a military unit; as well as a person who says the prayer, invocation, etc., for an organization or at an assembly.
To lend gravity, (v.): Give solemnity.
Dissent: To differ in sentiment or opinion, especially from the majority. « To write a dissenting opinion »
Irrespective of, (adj + prep): Regardless of
Afoul, (adj./adv.): In conflict with / to run afoul of
Impermissible, (adj.): That cannot be allowed
Coercion, (n.): Forcing by intimidation
Merely, (adv.): Simply
Constituent, (n.): Voter
Framer, (n.): Writer
Withstand something, (v.):  Resist
Assertion, (n.): Statement
Prominent, (adj.): Noticeable
Denigrate somebody, (v.): Disparage, put down
Solely, (adv.): Completely


Walker v Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, (2014)
-First Amendment-
(Listening Comprehension)

The question before the Court is whether a state can veto a message that uses  a design that is offensive to some people in this case the Confederate flag.

The Sons of Confederate Veterans requested the DMV, a government agency, to issue specialty licence plates featuring the Confederate flag. The DMV (the Department of Motor Vehicles), whose approval is required before licence plates are issued, disagreed / The DMV rejected the proposed plate on the grounds that a majority of the population associate the confederate flag with associations that demean or express hatred for minorities

This generated considerable controversy.

Indeed, some claim such a plate would be a reminder of a dark period of American history and of a legalised system of involuntary servitude, rape, mass murder.

The Sons of Confederate veterans, however, argue that the Confederate flag is a federally approved logo.

The Sons of Confederate Veterans sued, contending that the State violated their First Amendment Free Speech Right.

A federal District court found for the Sons of Confederate Veterans. A Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, and the State of Texas then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The argument of Texas is that an organisation cannot « commandeer » the machinery of government to convey a message that the government does not want to associate with.

The Former Solicitor General (speaking on behalf of Texas) argues that individuals are free to « festoon » their cars with « bumper stickers » representing the Confederate Flag if they want to, but that they cannot compel the State of Texas to issue official license plates featuring this flag.

The Association, on the other hand, claims that Texas has an official policy of honouring their forebears, thanks to monuments, statues, memorabilia, the reenactment of battles on Capitol Grounds and a state holiday honouring Confederate Veterans and that the DMV does not have the power to second-guess the legislature on whether or not to honour Confederate veterans. On top of this the Constitution does not give the power to ban certain categories of speech simply because they are offensive.

The former Texas Solicitor General rejects that proposition when the speaker is the State.

Nearly 40 years ago, (Wooley v. Maynard, 1977) the Supreme Court ruled that the government may not require drivers to put license plates on their cars that carry an ideological message they disagree with. That case concerned Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing to have licence plates featuring the New Hampshire State motto « Live Free of Die ».

In the present case, the question is reversed, questioning whether the State may reject some messages for specialty licence plates.

Vocabulary:

A proposition (n.): 1. something (such as a plan or offer) that is presented to a person or group of people to consider / 2. (in the document) a statement to be proved, explained, or discussed / 3. something that someone intends to do or deal with

To second-guess (someone) (v.): 1. to criticise or question the actions or decisions of someone / 2. to try to guess or predict what (someone or something) will do

The Court’s decision (from oyez.com):

Question

1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality?

2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination?
Conclusion

Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority.

The court ruled that, yes, « Specialty license plates qualify as government speech, thus states can refuse proposed designs. »

As for / With regard to question 2, « the Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas’s specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval ».





Elonis v. US (2015)

Schooling the Supreme Court on Rap Music

-First Amendment, True Threats and the intent of the Speaker-

This question in this case is whether « true threats » should be determined by the listener’s perception of the message or by the speaker’s intention. 
The court decision will serve two purposes:
It will establish a test to be applied to determine whether threats are protected by the First Amendment or not.
It will examine whether Rap lyrics are an Art form.
The reason why the case reached the Supreme Court is that at Elonis’s trial, the Jury had been instructed that the legal standard for finding true threat was whether an objective person would perceive the posts as threatening.
Elonis’s argument is that the test should focus on whether he intended the Facebook posts he sent to his ex-wife to be perceived as true threats. Elonis wants the Court to focus on the « mens rea » of the defendant.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied an objective test and ruled that to determine whether a message fitted in the category of true threat one should question whether a reasonable person would perceive the message as such.
On the other hand, in a case involving a white supremacist in Utah, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the intention of the speaker (thereby conducting an inquiry into the mind of the accused).
(From oyez.org)
PETITIONER: Anthony Elonis
RESPONDENT: United States
DECIDED BY: Roberts Court (2010-2016)
LOWER COURT: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Facts of the case
Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the "true threat" exception was created to prevent.
Question
Does a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. §875(c) require proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten?
Conclusion: 8–1 DECISION FOR ANTHONY ELONIS
MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR.
The law requires proof of the defendant's intent to threaten, not negligence or a reasonable listener test.
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten . An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed that the prosecution only needed to prove negligence, but he argued that the majority opinion should have addressed what the proper instruction should be. By leaving out what the prosecution did need to show, attorneys and judges are left to guess whether knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate standard. Justice Alito also argued that recklessness should be the standard because a higher standard would effectively change the law rather than clarify it.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals had already addressed this issue and resolved it with a general intent standard. The majority opinion not only overturns their rulings but also leaves the courts uncertain as to whether an intent to threaten is required or whether recklessness will suffice. Justice Thomas also argued that knowledge of posting the relevant threats is enough to establish the intent element because knowledge of those facts is required to make the actions illegal; ignorance of those actions being illegal should not provide shelter from the law.
Vocabulary selected by students in L3 G 54
Fighting words  Words intentionally directed toward another person which are so offensive as to cause the hearer to suffer emotional distress or incite him/her to immediately retaliate physically.
Hate speech  Speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, to distinguish with a speech of hatred against another person, for reasons others than discrimination.
Incorporated  a right protected by the Bill of Rights is incorporated when the US Supreme Court rules that it is so fundamental to the conception of due process of law that it must apply to the states through the 14th Amendment.
To sue  to initiate a legal action.
True threat  statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to an individual.
To distinguish with Offensive speech  words that can hurt the sensibility of the individual to whom it is addressed to, but that cannot be pursued, as it is protected by the First Amendment.
First Amendment (Freedom of Speech)  added to the US Constitution in 1791, contained in the Bill of Rights. In its dispositions relative to the freedom of speech, fundamental constitutional right, it is said that States cannot make any law that can abridge the freedom of speech.
Freedom of Speech  defined by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as the right for an individual to make know to anybody the result of his intellectual activity. It is now known as a fundamental individual right.
Reasonable person/Objective standard  legal standard sometimes used in court, that asks the question “how would a reasonable person interpret it ?”
Subjective standard  another legal standard that places the cursor on the person directly concerned, for instance to know if the person concerned felt himself threatened.






Shelby Co. v. Holder (14th Amendment)


Vocabulary selected by students in L3 G 54
An « amici curiae » brief : brief sent to the Supreme Court from someone who's not a party to the case, but has interests in the matter and who gives the court his opinion, tries to influence the court's decision.// Educates the Court on point of law that are in doubt, gathers or organizes information, or raises awareness about some aspect of the case that the court might otherwise miss.
To uphold: to maintain / affirm (esp. in legal English, to affirm a judicial decision, a ruling)
enforcement clause : a clause to make sure that the provision is enacted
To enforce (v.)
To enact legislation: to promulgate
(Note that « legislation » is uncountable / To enact legislation, to enact a piece of legislation)
Prophylactic (adj.): acting to defend/protect against
deference (Uncountable): to show respect
A bulwark : 1. (In the text) something serving as a safeguard / 2. a wall that is built for protection / 3. a wall that is part of a ship's sides and that is above the ship's upper deck
Preclearance: Advance approval by a federal court or the Department of Justice for changes to voting regulations in certain states under the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
CAC: Constitutional Accountability Center

Untruths about ‘anchor babies’ (14th Amendment)


Vocabulary selected by students in L3 G 2
A fine (n.) =  a :  a sum imposed as punishment for an offense / b : a forfeiture or penalty paid to an injured party in a civil action / in the text: to be understood in the sense of ‘paying the price for being undocumented’, as the situation was particularly difficult for Pedro’s parents.
Sidelines (n.) =   a line at right angles to a goal line or end line and marking a side of a court or field of play for athletic games / in the text: to stand on the sidelines = to watch something as a spectator, without taking part in the event.
Bias (n.): a tendency to believe that some people, ideas, etc., are better than others that usually results in treating some people unfairly / a strong interest in something or ability to do something
To be unbiased (adj.) = to be impartial (Antonym: to be biased)
To avoid (v.) = keep away from something/someone / Structure: to avoid doing something
avoid + v-ing
To wade across (v.) = to walk across something covered by water
Fanciful (adj.) = imaginary
Wholeness (n.) = 1. The state of forming a complete and harmonious whole; unity / 2. The state of being unbroken or undamaged / 3. Good physical or mental health. / entirety / integrity
To swaddle (v.) = to wrap (someone, especially a baby) tightly with a blanket, pieces of cloth, etc.
To open the floodgates (v.) = to remove something serving to restrain an outburst.
Ex: ‘Many people fear that the court's latest ruling will open the floodgates for/to a host of new lawsuits.’
Turgid (adj.) =  very complicated and difficult to understand / swollen 
To whine (v.) =  to complain in an annoying way / to make a high crying sound / to make a high and unpleasant sound that continues for a long time.